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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
v.

Case No. 20060131-CA

BRADY HAMILTON,
Defendant/ Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals his convictions for one count each of burglary, a second
degree felony, and theft, a Class A misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004).
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Was evidence that a co-defendant implicated defendant in the burglary,
and that defendant was attempting to start the stalled car containing stolen tools
shortly after the burglary, sufficient to withstand a motion for directed verdict?
Standard of Review. "In reviewing the denial of a motion for a directed
verdict based on a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, '[this Court] will
uphold the trial court's decision if, upon reviewing the evidence and all

inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, we conclude that some evidence
exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ^f 29, 84
P.3d 1183 (quoting State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221,1225 (Utah 1989)). A trial court
may deny a motion for directed verdict if, viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the State, it "finds that the state has established a 'prima facie case
against the defendant by producing believable evidence of all the elements of the
crime charged/"

Id. (quoting State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1992))

(additional quotation and citation omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Resolution of this case involves interpretation of the burglary and theft
statutes, the relevant portions of which are reproduced below.
Burglary.

(1)

An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains

unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with intent to commit:
(a) a felony;
(b) theft;
U T A H CODE A N N .

Theft

§ 76-6-202 (West 2004).

A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized

control over the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
U T A H CODE A N N .

§ 76-6-404 (West 2004).

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with one count each of burglary, a second
degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-202, and theft, a Class A
misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404. R.l. At the close of
the State's case, defendant moved for a directed verdict of acquittal on the
ground that the evidence was insufficient. R.222:5-8. Defendant argued that the
only evidence supporting his guilt was his co-defendant's out-of-court statement
that the co-defendant denied at trial. R.222:8. The trial court denied the motion.
R.222:20-23 (a copy of the trial court's oral ruling is included as Addendum A).
A jury convicted defendant as charged. R.121.
The trial court sentenced defendant to serve one to fifteen years in the
Utah State Prison on the burglary conviction. R.153. However, the trial court
suspended the prison sentence and placed defendant on probation for thirty-six
months with several conditions, including that he serve 270 days in the Utah
County Jail. R.155-54. The trial court imposed a ninety-five-day jail sentence on
the theft conviction. R.154.1
Defendant timely appealed. R.195.

Defendant filed a timely motion for new trial alleging that he had
obtained newly discovered evidence. R.159. The trial court denied that motion.
R. 193-91. Defendant does not appeal that decision.
3

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In June, 2004, Ethan Gale was driving through his Provo neighborhood on
his way home.

R.223:17-18.

As he passed his neighbor's house, he became

suspicious of a gold car parked in front of his neighbor's driveway. R.223;17-18.
Gale observed someone carry some bulky items out of his neighbor's garage and
throw the items into the back seat of the gold car. R.223:18,19-20. Gale noticed
two other persons in the front seat of the car. R.223: 18-19. Gale watched as the
person who carried the items from the garage jumped into the back seat of the
car and the car sped off with that person's legs still hanging out of the open car
door. R.223:18-20.
Gale described the individuals as "younger kids," but did not get a good
look at their faces. R.223:21. Suspecting that he had just witnessed a burglary,
Gale followed the gold car for about two minutes until it stopped at an
apartment complex. R.223:20, 21. Gale then went to a nearby gas station and
called police. R.223:20. While waiting for police to arrive, Gale drove back past
the gold car and noticed that the three individuals were no longer in the car.
R.223:22-23.

He assumed that they had gone into the apartment complex.

R.223:22-23.

4

Meanwhile, Nick Bandley was walking up his parent's driveway when he
heard someone holler from two or three houses away asking if he could help
jump-start a car. R.223:27, 29. Police later discovered that it was the same car
that had been used in the burglary. R.223:71-73. As Bandley approached the car
he saw defendant and another male. R.223:28, 30. A third male joined the group
after Bandley arrived. R.223:28, 30. Bandley and the others tried to start the car
without success. R.223:28. Eventually, Bandley offered to give the three a ride,
and they directed him to a home in Springville. R.223:28.
A short while later, Officer Hubbard arrived at the stalled car and
interviewed Ethan Gale. R.223:71-72. Officer Hubbard looked inside the car and
saw what he believed to be stolen tools in the back seat. R.223:72-73. He then
organized other officers to watch the car to see if any suspects returned.
R.223:72-73.
When Bandley returned from dropping off the three males in Springville,
he noticed several police cars surrounding the car he had been trying to help
jump-start. R.223:31-32. When Officer Hubbard approached Bandley and asked
him if he knew anything about the car, Bandley explained that he had just given
a ride to three people who had been trying to start the car. R.223:32. Bandley
was "a hundred percent positive" that defendant was one of the three who had
been trying to start the car. R.223:33.

5

"[A]n hour or two" after the burglary, an officer saw a suspicious car
approach the stalled car with the stolen tools inside. R.223:53, 75. A female was
driving the car, defendant was in the back seat, and his friend, Justin Broderick
was in the front passenger seat. R.223:75, 76, 78, 82.
Officer Hubbard stopped the car and questioned the occupants. R.223:7576. Broderick told Officer Hubbard that he and his friends were driving around
Provo when defendant told him to stop in front of a house. R.223:83. Broderick
explained that defendant then went into the garage and took some items.
R.223:84,118. Broderick also admitted that he had a drug problem, that he was
stealing things to obtain money for drugs, and that he had warrants for his
arrest. R.223:84. Officer Hubbard then questioned the other suspects. R.223:8485.
Officer Hubbard again spoke with Broderick and asked him to fill out a
written statement. R.223:84. During this second conversation, Officer Hubbard
asked Broderick, "[W]ho took the items from the garage?" R.223:85. Broderick
again responded that it was defendant. R.223:85, 96-98,118. Broderick's written
statement included his admission that "driv[]ing in Provo my friend got out and
took some st[uff] from a g[a]ra[]ge." R.223:49-50; State's Exhibit 2 (contained in
an unpaginated manila envelope).

Officers recovered a Dewalt sliding

6

compound miter saw and a Craftsman compressor set from the stalled car.
R.223:37.
At trial, Broderick testified that he grew up in Springville with defendant
and that he considers defendant to be a "[p]retty good friend/'

R.223:47.

Broderick admitted that he was driving a car in Provo on 6 June 2004 and that
the car broke down. R.223:48. He admitted that defendant was with him later
that day, but could not remember whether defendant was with him when his car
broke down. R.223:48. He also admitted that the stolen items were found in his
car. R.223:52. Broderick confirmed that he was the one driving the car; however,
he also testified that he was the one who ran into the garage and stole the tools.
R.223:52. Broderick denied having told Officer Hubbard that defendant was the
one who stole the tools. R.223:50-51.
By the time of defendant's trial, Broderick had pleaded guilty to burglary
and theft based on the same facts in defendant's case. R.223:49, 55,120-21. The
factual basis in Broderick's plea affidavit originally stated that "On June 6, 2004,
Justin Broderick was the driver of a vehicle that was used to commit a burglary
of a residence in Utah County. Justin drove the car while his friend, Brady
Hamilton, ran into a garage and took a $600 compound miter saw and a
craftsman air compressor." State's Exhibit 3 at 2, contained in a unpaginated
manila envelope.

However, the words "his friend, Brady Hamilton," were

7

crossed out and the words, "another individual/' were written in the margin. Id.
Broderick testified at defendant's trial that he had insisted that defendant's name
be removed from the plea affidavit and that he refused to plead guilty otherwise.
R.223-.56.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The evidence was sufficient to send the case to the jury because the State's
case was not based entirely on Broderick's out-of court statement to Officer
Hubbard implicating defendant. Rather, the State also presented evidence that,
shortly after the burglary, defendant, Broderick, and another male, were
attempting to start the stalled car containing the stolen tools in the back seat. The
State's evidence also demonstrated that, within two hours of the burglary,
defendant and Broderick returned again to the stalled car containing the stolen
tools. Viewed together, and in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, this
evidence was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of burglary and theft.
ARGUMENT
THE CO-DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT AND DEFENDANT'S
CONNECTION TO THE CAR CONTAINING THE STOLEN
TOOLS ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE CASE THAT
DEFENDANT COMMITTED BURGLARY AND THEFT
Defendant claims that the trial court erroneously denied his motion for a
directed verdict because the only evidence of his guilt was Broderick's unsworn
statement to police that Broderick ultimately denied at trial.
8

Br. Aplt. at 9.

However, the trial court correctly found that when evidence of defendant's
connection to the car containing the stolen tools was considered with Broderick's
statement, the evidence established a prima facie case that defendant had
committed burglary and theft. R.222: 20-23 (Add. A).
"In reviewing the denial of a motion for a directed verdict based on a claim
of insufficiency of the evidence, '[this Court] will uphold the trial court's decision
if, upon reviewing the evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn
from it, we conclude that some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury
could find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt/" State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, \ 29, 84 P.3d 1183 (quoting State v. Dibello,
780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989)). A trial court may deny a motion for directed
verdict if, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, it "finds
that the state has established a 'prima facie case against the defendant by
producing believable evidence of all the elements of the crime charged.'"

Id.

(quoting State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1992)) (additional quotation and
citation omitted).
Broderick told Officer Hubbard that defendant was the one who ran into
the garage and stole the tools. R.223:84-85, 96-98,118. However, after pleading
guilty himself, Broderick denied making the statement and testified

at

defendant's trial that he was the one who ran into the garage and stole the tools.

9

R.223:50-51. Broderick also testified that he was driving the car when the tools
were stolen from the garage. R.223:52.
"[A] conviction that is based entirely on a single, uncorroborated hearsay
out-of-court statement that is denied by the declarant in court under oath cannot
stand/ 7

State v. Ramsey, 782 P.2d 480, 484 (Utah 1989). Thus, if Broderick's

statement had been the only evidence of defendant's guilt, the State would not
have established a prima facie case against defendant.
However, the State's case was not "based entirely" on Broderick's
statement. See id. Rather, the State also presented evidence that, shortly after the
burglary, defendant and Broderick jointly enlisted Nick Bandley's help to try and
jump-start the car containing the stolen tools. R.28, 30. The stolen tools were in
plain view in the back seat of the car.

R.223:72-73.

The evidence also

demonstrated that defendant and Broderick returned to the car containing the
stolen tools within two hours of the burglary. R.223:53, 75, 76, 78, 82.
Defendant responds that "'mere presence with the perpetrators of the
substantive crime is insufficient to support a conviction.'"

Aplt. Br. at 12

(quoting United States v. Summers, 414 R3d 1287,1294 (10th Cir. 2005)). However,
defendant's connection to the car containing the stolen tools was not the only
evidence of defendant's guilt.

The jury also heard evidence of Broderick's

10

admission to police that defendant was the one who ran into the garage and stole
the tools. R.223:84-85, 96-98,118.
Defendant's claim fails because he analyzes each piece of evidence in
isolation.

However, the trial court properly considered the entirety of '"the

evidence, and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it7" in denying
defendant's motion for directed verdict. See Montoya, 2004 UT 5 at \ 9 (quoting
Dibello, 780 P.2d at 1225).

Neither Broderick's statement to police, nor

defendant's connection to the car with the stolen tools, would alone be sufficient
to establish a prima facie case against defendant.

However, when viewed

together, this evidence suffices.
A person commits burglary if he "enters or remains unlawfully in a
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit . . . theft." UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-6-202(l)(b) (West 2004). "A person commits theft if he obtains
or exercises unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose to
deprive him thereof." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404 (West 2004).
Properly viewed as a whole, the evidence was sufficient to justify sending
the case to the jury. Broderick told police that defendant was the one who ran
into the garage and stole the tools. R.223:84-85, 96-98, 118. Shortly after the
burglary, defendant was trying to start the stalled car containing the stolen tools
and he again returned to that car within two hours of the burglary.

11

R.191,

223:27-30, 75, 76, 78, 82. The victim also testified that neither defendant nor
Broderick had his permission to take his tools.

R.223:41-42.

These facts

constituted "'some evidence . . . from which a reasonable jury could find that the
elements of [burglary and theft] had been proven beyond a reasonable d o u b t / "
See Montoya, 2004 UT 5 at \ 29 (quoting Dibello, 780 P.2d at 1225).
Defendant argues that "the evidence was unequivocal that only one
person went into the garage and took the tools — and Broderick [both] testified
under oath that he was that person [and] pled guilty to having done so." Br.
Aplt. at 10. However, Broderick's attempt to accept full responsibility for the
crime lacked credibility. Broderick testified that he both drove the car used in
the burglary, and was the individual who ran into the garage to steal the tools.
R.223:52. But an eyewitness, Ethan Gale, testified that the person who had stolen
the tools jumped into the backseat of the car and that the car sped off with that
person's legs still hanging out of the open rear door.

R.223:18-20.

Gale's

testimony renders Broderick's account factually impossible. Therefore, viewed
in a light most favorable to the State, Broderick's acceptance of full responsibility
did not diminish the State's prima facie case against defendant.
Defendant also complains that, in both his written and oral statements to
police, Broderick never identified defendant by name as the person who ran into
the garage and stole the tools. Br. Aplt. at 10. While Broderick did not use

12

defendant's name, Officer Hubbard explained that there was no confusion that
Broderick identified defendant as the person who stole the tools from the garage.
Defendant and Broderick returned to the stalled car containing the stolen
tools in another car driven by a female. R.223:75, 76, 78, 82.

Broderick was in

the front seat of that car and defendant was in the back seat. R.223:75, 76, 78, 82.
Officer Hubbard testified that he stopped that car and questioned Broderick
while the two sat in his patrol car. R.75-76, 78. When he asked Broderick "[W]ho
took the items from the garage?" Broderick replied, "Hamilton" (the defendant).
R.223:85.
On cross-examination, Officer Hubbard explained that Broderick never
actually used defendant's name, but responded that it was "[t]he back seat
passenger" who had stolen the items from the garage.

R.223:96-97, 98, 104.

However, Officer Hubbard further explained that when Broderick referred to
"the backseat passenger," Officer Hubbard clarified the response by asking
Broderick if he was referring to the backseat passenger in "[t]hat car right there,
the one I just pulled over, the one we're parked right behind, that one right now,
where there's a guy sitting in the back[?]" R.223:97. Broderick responded, "Yes."
R.223:97. Therefore, although Broderick may not have identified defendant by
name, there was no question that he was referring to defendant as the person
who stole the items from the garage.

13

Taken together, and viewed in a light most favorable to the State,
Broderick's statement, and the evidence of defendant's connection to the car
containing the stolen tools, sufficed to send the case to the jury. See Montoya,
2004 UT 5, ^f 29. Therefore, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion
for a directed verdict.
CONCLUSION
The Court should affirm defendant's convictions.
Respectfully submitted If

December 2006.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD
Assistant Attorney General
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Addendum A

sole evidence, dismissal would be appropriate."
They recognize this at the meetings. They recognize
the problem and worry for prior inconsistent statements. They
have no other direct evidence that Mr. Hamilton committed the
crime. They're relying solely upon a prior inconsistent
statement of a codefendant to convict Mr. Hamilton. And it's
wrong. It should not be sent to a jury. We should not
entrust -- this should stop now.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Anything else before I rule?
In this case, I'm going to deny the motion for the
directed verdict. There is sufficient evidence to allow the
case to go to the jury. I'm going to recite that really
briefly.
True, we have an out-of-court statement. The only
direct evidence of identification in this case - I'm saying
direct rather than circumstantial evidence -- is the statement
by Mr. Broderick where he identifies -- at least there's
evidence that he identifies Mr. Hamilton as the one who went
in the garage and took the DeWalt miter saw and the compressor
out.
Now, if that were uncorroborated by any
circumstantial evidence, then I think the defense motion would
be well taken because, like in the Ramsay case, that alleged
out-of-court statement would be the only evidence that would

20

1 I support the conviction on that particular count.
Where we're different from Ramsay is, on that
particular count, there was no corroboration. The Court
determined, in other words, the only evidence, uncorroborated
or not, was the boy's out-of-court statement. Here we
actually have quite a bit of corroboration which, if the jury
believes it, could support a conviction beyond a reasonable
doubt.
The evidence would be that the first witness,
Mr. Gale, sees these three individuals in the car and sees one
of them jump into the car, take off with his legs hanging out
of the back seat, sees where the cars goes, reports it to the
police. Admittedly, the car is out of his sight for probably
about a half hour while he's at the service station. However,
during that time, or shortly after that time, we have
Mr. Bandley coming up to the car to help these three gentlemen
jump their car and definitely recognizes Mr. Hamilton as being
present.
Now, this is fairly quickly after the alleged offense
had occurred. You have this vehicle there within a fairly
proximate time of when the offense occurred, perhaps as early
as 15 to 30 minutes. Probably not more than that. And so you
have that going on. You have an identification there, at
least of this gentleman being in the area of this stolen
property within a very proximate time to its having been

21

1 I stolen.
2

Then, finally, we have the statement of Mr. Broderick

3

given to the patrolman who is investigating this case,

4

basically telling him that, yeah, this is the gentleman who

5

went in the garage and took the property out. And Detective

6

Hubbard has given him his Miranda warnings. He knows he's in

7

trouble. He's making a statement, and then he comes in here

8

and contradicts the statement. Nevertheless, he has made an

9

out-of-court statement which is admissible under the rules of

10

hearsay under a couple of rules for substantive purposes. So

11

I think that that statement is corroborated.

12

Even had it not been corroborated, the fact that

13

Mr. Hamilton is with the property within less than an hour

14

after it's taken and is associated with this vehicle less than

15

an hour after it's taken I think would probably be

16

circumstantial evidence that could even support a conviction

17

on its own, being in the possession of recently stolen

18

property. But we don't even have that circumstance here

19

because we do have the statements being made and the

20

corroboration.

21

I think, based on that, there is substantial evidence

22

that would justify the jury being able to determine

23

credibility and weigh the evidence. When I say substantial

24

evidence, I don't mean overwhelming evidence. I mean the

25

legal definition of substantial evidence which would be

CERTIFfkD

allowed to go to a jury. On that basis, I'm going to deny the
motion. I think the jury can consider this case and determine
whether or not there is sufficient evidence to support a
finding beyond a reasonable doubt. That will be the ruling of
the Court.
MR. LARSON:
THE COURT:

Thank you, Judge.
Anything else? I think you preserved

that issue. You even cited case authority. I think you've
done a good job on the motion, Mr. Howell. Anything else that
you wanted to bring up?
MR. HOWELL:
THE COURT:

No, Judge.
Are you ready to proceed with your case,

then?
MR. HOWELL:

Just a second, Judge.

(Counsel and Defendant confer off the record.)
MR. HOWELL:
THE COURT:

Judge, the defense rests.
What we could do, then, is go ahead and

go through jury instructions. There may be some we need to
add in light of the defense posture. We'll have to check.
I'll let counsel decide. Do either of you think that it would
be best to tell the jury that we're going to take a half hour
or so to go through jury instructions? We'll have to go
through them and copy them, which takes at least 15 minutes.
Craig will have lots of copy machines involved, but it takes
at least 15 minutes.

TRANSCRIPT
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